After Sept 11, 110 Nobel laureates released a statement saying "The only hope for the future lies in cooperative international action, legitimized by democracy...To survive in the world we have transformed, we must learn to think in a new way". This chapter argues for criminologists contributing and thinking in a new way by returning to and updating the notion of The Challenge of Crime in A Free Society. It reviews present challenges from terrorism and criminology's shortcomings, explores implications of the new conception, and highlights difficulties in studying anti-American terrorism as well as continued attention to domestic terrorism.
Introduction
The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (FBI 2002a) for 2001 registered an increase in homicides of 2.5%, notable as an end to the decade long drop in crime rates just as criminology produced the first book on the topic (Blumstein and Wallman 2000) .
Interesting in their absence are all the victims of September 11 terrorism from the categories of murder, assault and hate crimes. While airplane-into-skyscraper is not what comes to mind when thinking about the 'crime problem,' mass murder is still murder -and the UCR has 'explosion' as a subcategory of homicide that has even been used for past terrorism victims.
Excluding 9-11 victims is not based on uncertainty as to how many deaths occurred: for New York, the FBI notes there are 2,830 homicides and 7,233 aggravated assaults that it didn't count. The assaults are excluded because of a "Hierarchy Rule of still infrequent enough to pose the question of why their victimization (such as those cannibalized by John Wayne Gacey) is accepted as 'day to day' crime.
The six victims of the first World Trade Center bombing were included in that year's UCR without comment. But Ramzi Yousef, one of those ultimately convicted, wanted to kill 250,000: "Yousef would explain [it was] the number killed by the American atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If he could murder on that scale, he believed, he would teach the United States it was in a war" (Benjamin and Simon 2002: 7) . His plan was to cause an explosion that would make one tower fall and knock over the other one. While the ultimate damage was not on the order Yousef expected, six deaths, more than a thousand injured, and $500 million in damage -"the worst terrorist act" in the nation's history, according to prosecutors (Kittrie and Wedlock 1998: 761) -is not day to day crime.
Further, the 168 victims of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh are included in the UCR, with a note in the state data to explain the dramatic increase in Oklahoma's homicide rate (FBI 1996: 64, 78) . McVeigh was an enthusiastic reader of the Turner Diaries (MacDonald 1978) , a fictional account of Earl Turner's resistance to the 'Zionist Occupied Government' that had overtaken the U.S. and was mistreating white citizens, including through disarming them. Turner starts by passing out leaflets, but by the novel's end becomes a suicide terrorist flying an aircraft loaded with a nuclear weapon in a morning mission to the Pentagon. McVeigh did not have the resources of his fictional hero, but his revenge for the government's killing of citizens at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco (Hamm 1997) was the "deadliest terrorist attack in United
States history" (Kittrie and Wedlock 1998: 776) . The incident is not day to day crime, but the UCR's Index Crime section recorded that murder by explosion increased from 10 in 1994 to 190 in 1995 (FBI 1996 .
The attacks of 9-11 are larger in scale, but it hardly makes sense for the UCR to include relatively smaller acts of terrorism when they are the 'worst in history,' and exclude larger ones. According to the FBI, the UCR's "primary objective is to provide a reliable set of criminal justice statistics for law enforcement administration, operation and management " (2002: 2) . If so, then it should show what criminal justice professionals already know -that Sept 11 changed their mission and jobs. The FBI now has agents at 46 locations around the world, and "plans to open offices in Kabul, Jakarta and eight other foreign capitals as part of a decade long overseas expansion that officials say is crucial to meet the global threat of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups" (Anderson 2003) . The UCR notes its 70 year history is based on "law enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting crimes that were a product of society of the time. However, that society has evolved into a more complex, global society of the twenty-first century that is faced with fighting crimes that previously had been unimaginable" (FBI 2001: 302) . The FBI may be opening field offices in Uzbeckistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Yemen, but rather than also updating this important statistical reference, the FBI clearly thinks that it is better for the UCR and the mindset of all who depend it on it for information, to be firmly grounded in a simpler era not concerned with global terrorism.
Adding in all the World Trade Center victims of 9-11 does add an outlier to crime data, creating difficulties in analyzing issues like the impact of community policing on violent crime. But since the number of Sept 11 victims is known exactly, individual researchers can 'correct' for the impact of terrorism after justifying to themselves and the readers that it is necessary to make the research more 'meaningful.' Such data correction will be legitimate for many projects, but there is value in the making the researcher justify removing it and in the process be introspective about the continued significance of the research question in light of 'unimaginable' new crimes. By including the 9-11 victims, people using the UCR would have a visual reminder of the event because the spike in the homicide graph becomes a memorial -a simple and odd memorial, but one which has great power to engage the thoughts of anyone reading official publications and their derivatives about the nation's 'crime problem.'
Remembering 9-11 would be a regular occurrence exerting an ongoing push on the discipline. Instead, the UCR sets up a model for criminology that continues its disciplinary status quo, which is a "grudging acceptance of terrorism" (Rosenfeld 2002: 1).
The problems with not conceptualizing terrorism as crime ultimately go beyond consistency or integrity with the UCR, or even the effects on criminology.
Acknowledging the tragic events as crime would require more emphasis on criminal procedure and individual rights enshrined by the Constitution. Negating September 11 victims from 'day to day' crime signals that they are outside traditional notions of a rule of law and supports Presidential assertions about the propriety of unprecedented power; it becomes easier for the administration to set up what have been called 'legal black holes' like Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay where the detainees (including several children) are not recognized as criminal defendants or Prisoners of War. Excluding 9-11 victims undercuts the growing need to further develop international law and stronger institutions of international justice for a shrinking global village. Three decades of wars on crime and drugs have already eroded many procedural safeguards important to a democratic society, and the war on terrorism has created further shortcuts in the freedoms that the U.S. is allegedly trying to protect. This is important not just to those whose rights are immediately affected, but also because -contrary to the facile notion that the terrorists 'hate us because we're free' -the Pew Center's Global Attitudes project found "a pattern of support for democratic principles combined with the perception that their nation is currently lacking in these areas is characteristic of many Muslim nations" (Pew Center 2003: 40) . Thus, championing democracy in deeds as well as rhetoric is crucial both to preserving the core values of the nation and to U.S. moral leadership in the world.
When the Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of its "Doomsday Clock" from nine to seven minutes before midnight, they noted the terrorist acts should have been a global wake-up call: "Moving the clock's hands at this time reflects our growing concern that the international community has hit the 'snooze' button rather than respond to the alarm." The Board went on to "fully support" this warning signed by 110 Nobel laureates: "The only hope for the future lies in cooperative international action, legitimized by democracy...To survive in the world we have transformed, we must learn to think in a new way" (Atomic Scientists 2002). However, since that time, the U.S. pursued a unilateralist war on Iraq, unsupported by the United Nations and without meaningful international cooperation. Disturbingly, the Pew Center found that America has lost much of the goodwill it gained after the attacks of 9-11: "The bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world" (2003: 3).
In the face of this dire situation, the question is, Can criminology can be a constructive influence for thinking in cooperative, democratic and new ways? Will the discipline instead follow the UCR in keeping the pre-9-11 mentality with its implicit repudiation of the rule of law? If criminologists can overcome disciplinary inertia, what could they contribute?
This chapter argues that criminology can and should make a contribution to the pressing problem of terrorism and in doing so make long overdue disciplinary changes by becoming more global and as interested in topics like ethnic cleansing as serial killers. However, the criminal justice system has spent three decades fighting wars on crime and drugs -efforts that at best have been marginally successful despite Sadly, even after the 9-11 crisis, American interest in foreign news is low, with the number who follow international news 'somewhat closely' unchanged from before 9-11. The "modest increase" in those who follow foreign news 'very closely' "comes from the ranks of those who are already interested in international news" (Kutz 2002: A13) . In spite of low interest in information about the world, Americans are willing to back extreme measures to the fight the war on terror: "one in 3 could accept governmentsanctioned torture of suspects" and "27 percent could support using nuclear weapons, Success by European nations and the failure of Arab states to achieve the same furthers the perception of double standards and persecution of Muslims. In addition, the situation creates a strong rift with European states that have all abolished capital punishment, even for war crime and genocide, because it "has no place in the penal system of modern civilized societies" (in Grant 1998: 20) . In contrast, the U.S. is steadfast in the face of United Nations criticism of its frequent executions for day to day crimes. America has even executed foreign nationals who had not been notified of the right under the Vienna Convention to contact their embassy for assistance -and one such execution proceeded in violation of a stay ordered by the International Court of
Justice (Grant 1998 ).
More generally, the U.S. demands that other countries extensively revise their laws and legal system to comply with human rights treaties, while it reserves the right to continue executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded. The War on Terror exacerbates existing tensions over capital punishment, which are symbolic of larger skepticism over U.S. moral leadership on human rights and its separatism within an international legal order at a time when the emphasis needs to be on democratic actions and international cooperation.
Although criminology can not be responsible for the full range of challenges outlined above, its own shortcomings should be acknowledged before advocating an expansion into new areas. Feagin, in the published version of his American Sociological Association Presidential Address, has a major heading: "Be More Self-Critical" (2001: 13). In the spirit of "accelerated self-reflection" it is important to note that 'crime' is Americans, including criminologists, do not tend to believe that genocide has happened in the U.S. (Johnson and Leighton 1999; Churchill 1997) (Barak 1998: 39) . Even though 'war crimes' has the word 'crime' in it, the topic and related issues like the International Criminal Court are rarely discussed in criminology's main journals or conferences. International Law and human rights are likewise marginalized, largely through the impact of political decisions:
The set of [Reservations, Understandings and Declarations] which the Senate has attached to each human rights treaty on ratification has prevented the treaty's provisions from having any direct effect through U.S. courts and from giving individuals justiciable rights. This is one of the principle reasons why international human rights law is so little known, or used, by U.S. lawyers and civil rights advocates and why human rights treaties have remained essentially 'off shore,' and have had little visible impact on U.S. law or practice. (Grant 1998: 26) .
The U.S. and other democratic counties thus face the threat of terrorism for the foreseeable future. Besides understanding this violence, key challenges lay in protecting the freedoms that make the U.S. respected round the world and engaging international law in a way that does not undermine our ability to (as the Atomic Scientists put it) pursue 'cooperative international action, legitimized by democracy.'
Criminology has some potential to contribute to these pressing problems, but the discipline requires long overdue changes to make it more worldly and intellectually Packer (1967) calls the President's "embarrassingly naïve" questions (which are not even quoted in the final report) and set off on its own agenda. The Commission included four members from the police and prosecution, but no criminal defense attorneys, and still managed to highlight the importance of freedom: "Our system of justice deliberately sacrifices much in efficiency and even in effectiveness in order to preserve local autonomy and to protect the individual" (1967: 7).
In the next sentence, the Commission states that "sometimes it may seem to sacrifice too much," and noted the limited success in fighting organized crime. One could replace the Commission's reference of "Cosa Nostra-type criminal organizations"
with "al Qaida and terrorist networks" and capture current sentiments, just as enemies prior to the Commission (Communism, etc) also created concern about excessive individual rights. However, in reviewing situations going back to Colonial times, former Supreme Court Justice Douglas notes :
"Short cuts are always tempting when one feels his cause is just. Short cuts have always been justified on the grounds that the end being worthy, the means of reaching it are not important. Short cuts, however, are dangerous. If they can be taken against one person or group, they can be taken against another. Our greatest struggle has been to provide procedural safeguards that will protect us against ourselves and make as certain as possible that reason and calm judgment will not be swept away by passion and hysteria"
(1954: 69).
Overall, Packer (1967) rightly criticizes the Commission's report for avoiding fundamental questions in favor of a public education document awash in "particularism"
with recommendations that are "unexpceptional" and "mechanical" ("more money, more people, more research"). Embracing The Challenge of Crime in A Free Society is thus not a call to reread the report, but to recognize the Commission had a productive guiding framework. The ensuing decades focused on 'order' rather than freedom, and the threat of terrorism creates further temptations to sacrifice freedom (even in the name of protecting it). Thus, a new conception should return to embracing freedom, be updated to include terrorism and recognize that technology has made the world so interconnected as to give the globe the feel of a village. Although the entire field of criminology need not take up such questions, criminologists should consider using 9-11, its anniversaries and related events as time for introspection about whether to devote some of the energy to The Challenge of Terrorism for the Free Societies in the Global Village.
For those studying terrorism and related issues, this conception helps to guard against further unnecessary erosions in the democratic freedoms the country is The last paragraph hints at the second major set of implications, which have to do with the moral and political stance to the topics. Explicit within The Challenge of Terrorism is a concern for democratic freedoms, which in turn is grounded in a conception advanced by Feagin (2001: 6) and Quinney (2003) that the discipline needs to advance the social good and social justice. Quinney conceives of "Criminology as
Moral Philosophy" (2003: 355), similar to Postman's view that all social science is moral theology in that it strives "not, obviously, to contribute to our field, but to contribute to human understanding and decency" (1988: 17). Quinney adds the "Criminologist as
Witness," by which he means criminology should be a "stance for the witnessing of contemporary history " (2003: 366) . Witnessing is not just a passive act but also includes the critique, for example of shortcuts in democratic freedoms, violations of international law (especially when they undermine the potential for international cooperative action), and U.S. refusal to recognize "the political culture of Texas is no less exempt from human rights scrutiny than that of Tehran or Badhdad" (Grant 1998: 29) The previous paragraphs are meant to be more illustrative than definitive about the impact of a new guiding framework. Although it is not suggested as The Paradigm for all criminology, seeding classrooms with these issues and framework will help students see that criminology is relevant to what's on the nightly national news and not just the crime reported on the local evening news. Many of the students will be domestic criminologists or criminal justice practitioners, but criminology can still play a role in preparing them to be citizens of a global village, and hopefully ones who have reverence for democratic freedoms instead of blind patriotism.
The Challenge of Studying Terrorism:
Anti-Americanism, Anti-Semitism and 'Christian Terrorism'
Serial killers seem to be chic; they are the object of cultural fascination and attract numerous students to be psychological profilers, like the 'mindhunters' in true crime books and myriad popular media. The passion for learning how to think like a serial killer does not apply to getting inside the head of a terrorist, so there's much more interest in understanding Ted Bundy or even Jack the Ripper than Osama bin Laden.
Investigating serial killers tends to be an exercise in abnormal psychology, drawing mostly from individual biography. Understanding terrorism requires confronting the disturbing conclusion that people responsible for mass violence are in many ways normal iii , at least in the sense that people with diagnosable personality disorders tend not to work well in teams or organizations. Indeed, in an extensive literature review, Hudson (1999) concludes that "there is little reliable evidence to support the notion that terrorists in general are psychologically disturbed individuals." questioned the purpose of making freshmen study "our enemy's religion" (ibid).
[However, one freshman, demonstrating a much better grasp of the issues, commented:
"After the terrorist attacks, I was so angry that I really didn't care to learn anything about There's a large undercurrent out there that did not believe President Bush when he said Islam is not our enemy. We don't need to condemn those people, or dismiss them. We should talk with them and really talk this thing through, because we're going to be involved in conflicts in areas with largely Muslim populations for the foreseeable future (Nightline 2002) .
Indeed, the magnitude of the problem with Muslim countries and antiAmericanism is underscored by the Pew Center's Global Attitudes Survey, which asked people in different countries about their confidence in different leaders to "do the right thing regarding world affairs" (2003) . Osama bin Laden came out ahead of President Bush in several countries whose combined population approaches a half billion people (see Table 1 ). This survey, done after 9-11, is consistent with earlier information that "scores of Pakistanis have named their newborn sons Osama," highlighting that the terrorists may be on the fringe "but those who applaud are the disenfranchised Muslims everywhere" (Reeve 1999: 203) . (Kooistra 1989) , which examines the celebrity status accorded wild west outlaws and 20 th Century gangsters. Hero status occurs when an audience finds "some symbolic meaning in his criminality" (1989:152), for example when substantial segments of the public feel "'outside the law' because the law is no longer seen as an instrument of justice but as a tool of oppression wielded by favored interests" (1989:11). At such times, or among groups with this perception, there is a 'market' for symbolic representations of justice and "a steady need for the production of celebrities" (Kooistra 1989:162) . (This analysis indicates an issue going beyond individual terrorists and suggests that disenfranchisement is a more fruitful avenue than the more simplistic question of whether poverty causes terrorism.)
Although anti-Americanism is an important issue, there are also significant limitations on its ability to explain terrorist attacks perhaps directed at Western targets but that kill large numbers of Arabs and fellow Muslims. Hoagland notes: "Events since World Order' and/or the U.S. government, with mass media ("Jewsmedia" rather than "newsmedia") being the propaganda arm of ZOG (Ridgeway 1995; Ezekiel 1995; MacDonald 1978) . Among those on the survivalist right who see the U.S. government as having lost legitimacy, the strikes on the Pentagon, World Trade Center and a heavily Jewish town like New York City were not cause for anger or patriotism, but respect at a successor to McVeigh (Hamm 1997) . (Remember that the FBI still does not know if the anthrax attacks on the media and Congress were from al Qaida or a domestic terrorist with is own anti-government agenda.)
Aside from concerns about U.S. and foreign terrorists working together, the larger point is not to get so focused on al Qaida as to forget about domestic threats.
Russell argues that black men and crime are so closely linked and so strongly embody white America's fear of crime as to warrant using "criminalblackman" (1998). This focus on street crime, especially by racial minorities, helps deflect attention from a great deal of white collar and corporate crime (Enron, etc) that is far more harmful (Reiman 2004 
Conclusion
Realizing that an unknown number of people harbor fantasies of mass nuclear annihilation is disturbing -even more so when one considers the popularity of bin Laden or the Turner Diaries. There's a temptation to find topics that don't keep one up at night and that make better polite conversation when people ask about what you study. Criminology journals are likely to remain receptive to unimaginative and marginally relevant but technically well executed quantitative pieces over an extended treatment of issues raised in this chapter. While not all criminologists should take up these topics, more should -and professional introspection should be widely encouraged.
Researchers who investigate genocide note that they risk displacing economics as 'the dismal science,' and studying terrorism is a step in that same direction. But there are also risks in not moving in that direction, of rearranging deck chairs (or regression models of deck chair theft) and neglecting the big threats. Friedrichs, "as someone who has co-taught a course on the Holocaust for quite a number of years" had "long wondered what German criminologists were doing in the 1930s, while their state was in the process of implementing one of the great crimes in human history" (2002).
Obviously they were not addressing Nazism and he asks, "What the Hell were they thinking?" iv Many continued to study conventional forms of criminal behavior, which some imbued with the racist, biogenic approach of the government. While not trying to compare the U.S. to the Nazis, the point is to ask about the judgment of history at an important juncture: will future generations ask of criminology, "What were they thinking?"
ENDNOTES:
i Elsewhere, I have created an extensive web page that discusses the string of terrorism attributed to Al Qaida, as well as links discussing the group's intensive efforts to ii Iatrogenic is a medical term related to injury or illness that result from medical treatment, such as getting an infection from an operation. Within the drug war, the harm reduction approach blames current policies for infections and HIV because clean needle exchanges are not legal; one effect of mass incarceration is to weaken informal social controls like family and community (Clear 2002) . President Bush went into Iraq supposedly to prevent terrorism, but at this point the chaotic situation may be a breeding ground for terrorism and anti-Americanism.
iii In an often quoted passage, Arendt remarks that six psychiatrists certified Nazi Eichmann "as 'normal'--'More normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him,' one of them is said to have exclaimed, while another had found that his whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends, was 'not only normal but most desirable '"(1964: 25-26) .
iv He used this more pointed language in a discussion we had at the first American Society of Criminology meeting after 9-11.
